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Comparing
Implied and
Express
Constitutional
Freedoms
David S. Bogen*

Both the United States and Australia are constitutional democracies with
a common law heritage. Both value free speech, but they have different
means of implementing that value. Until recently, that difference was
between a common law principle and a judicially protected constitutional
freedom. Australian courtsused freedom of speech as a tool of statutory
construction. 1 The Australian Constitution has no free speech clause, and
for many years it was assumed that the power of Parliament was not
limited by any constitutionally protected freedom. 2 This assumption
proved wrong when the High Court, in Australian Capital Television Pty
Limited v The Commonwealth, 3 held that freedom of political discussion is
implicit in the Constitution because it is a necessary element of repre-
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BA, LLB (Harvard), LLM (NYU); T. Carroll Brown Scholar and Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law, Baltimore, Maryland, United States. The author wishes
to thank the Sydney University Law School where he was a Parsons Fellow in February
and March cf 1995 for their hospitality, and his colleague Greg Young for his suggestions. This article is a revised and extended version of remarks at a luncheon for the
University of Melbourne Law Foundation on 28 April 1995, and before the Faculty of
Law, Griffith University, on 18 May 1995.
Re Bolton; Ex parte Beane (1987) 162 CLR 514,523, per Brennan J; Potter v Minahan (1908)
7 CLR 277, 304, per O'Connor J.
'A court will interpret laws of the Parliament in light of a presumption that the Parliament does not intend to abrogate human rights and fundamental freedoms, but the court
cannot deny the validity of an exercise of a legislative power expressly granted merely
on the ground that the law abrogates human rights and fundamental freedoms or trenches
upon political rights which, in the court's opinion, should be preserved': Nationwide
News Pty Ltd v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1, 43, per Brennan J.
(1992) 177 CLR 106; Nationwide News Ply Ltd v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1; Theophanous v
Herald & Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 124 ALR 1; Stephens v West Australian Newspapers Ltd
(1994) 124 ALR 80; and Cunliffe v Commonwealtl! (1994) 124 ALR 120.
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sentative democracy, a basic principle inferred from the structure and
express provisions of the Australian Constitution. This 1992 decision adds
a new dimension to the debate on whether to adopt a constitutional provision on free speech in Australia. 4 The question is no longer only whether
freedom of speech should be constitutionally protected, but also whether
such protection should be based on a new express clause or continue to
be implied from existing provisions.
Interpretation is necessary to apply a Constitution to a specific situation. The process ranges from declaring the plain meaning of text to creating principles with no specific textual roots. Along this spectrum, the
interpretation of express language is not always clearly distinguishable
from implying a principle from the document's language or structure.
Some may even argue that these are false categories. The categories are
recognised in practice, and for the purpose of addressing whether to support an express constitutional provision on freedom of political discussion in Australia, it is argued that the distinction makes a difference.
This note addresses the differences between express and implied constitutional freedoms, but it does not attempt to directly compare Australia with the United States. Three years is too short a period to discern
with any confidence the ultimate scope of the implied freedom of political discussion in Australia or the standards that will be applied. Further,
the historical development of the principle in the society, the traditions of
the judiciary, and the personality and background of the specific judges
are more important influences on the ultimate contours of a judicially
protected freedom than whether it is expressly secured in the Constitution. Nevertheless, the American experience is relevant to evaluating the
contrast between an express and an implied clause.

THE ENTRENCHMENT OF AN EXPRESS
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
An express freedom is more entrenched than if it were only implied. There
is objective evidence of public support for it, it is more likely to become a

part of the core educational process for citizens, the judicial role in interpretation is less open to criticism, and there are fewer ways to terminate
it. It does not mean the implied principle is likely to be repudiated, but
courts may give greater deference to government than if the implication
were made explicit. Whether that is an advantage depends on the degree
to which such deference is considered desirable.

4

Philip Alston (ed.), Towards an Australian Bill of Rights (Canberra: Centre for International and Public Law, Australian National University, Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, 1994).
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Evidence of Political Support
The express provision provides direct evidence that a supermajority5 at
one time coalesced on the importance of the stated principle. By placing
it in the Constitution, Parliament showed agreement not only upon its
verbal formulation, but upon its nature as fundamental. It is a result of a
process spelled out in the foundational document. An implied freedom
lacks a similar imprimatur.
The Constitution prescribes processes for establishing a principle to
limit the power of the government. Following those processes to obtain
an express provision in the Constitution is difficult and requires widespread popular support. Its adoption does not show that supporters understood or agreed upon its meaning, but it does demonstrate agreement
on the need to make specific language part of the Constitution.
A judicially implied limit on government power may have just as much
popular support as an explicit one, but there is no conventional mechanism to express that support. An implication suggests that express constitutional provisions included acceptance of the implied principle, but
an inference is not as conclusive as adoption of the express language.
Public opinion polls, political demonstrations, and the behaviour of individuals and organisations may indicate that an implied principle is embedded in the society. A principle may be deeply embedded, as freedom
of speech is in England, without being appropriate for use by the judiciary to override legislation. Failure to amend the Constitution to reverse
the judicial implication of a constitutional limit is similarly inconclusive
as an indicator of popular support for judicial protection of the principle.
Amendment requires a supermajority, agreement on specific language,
and overcoming indifference and inertia as well as active opposition. The
difficulty of amendment is one illustration that an express constitutional
provision satisfies the conventions for creating fundamental principles
in a way that no evidence of support for an implied principle can match.

Educational Effect
Express protection of a constitutional freedom has the didactic advantage of putting the societal expression of basic principle in concrete form.
The First Amendment to the United States' Constitution provides: 'Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press.' 6 An implied freedom does not have a similar fixed form. Mason

5

'

A supermajority requirement goes beyond a simple majority: see, for example, s. 128 of
the Commonwealth Constitution. Section 128 allows for alterations of the Constitution
so long as there is a majority of the electorate as well as a majority of the States.
Constitution of the United States, Amendment I.
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CJ, Toohey and Gaudron JJ described the comparable constitutional freedom in Australia as:
... 'freedom of communication, at least in relation to public affairs and political discussion', 'freedom ... to discuss governments and political matters',
'freedom of communication about the government of the Commonwealth'
which 'extends to all political matters', including 'matters relating to other
levels of government', 'freedom of political discourse' and 'freedom of participation, association and communication in relation to federal elections'.'
Although there is acknowledgment that the last formulation differed
substantially from the others, Mason CJ, Toohey and Gaudron JJ suggested
the other phrases would serve as expressions of the constitutional principle. Precedent and convention may ultimately produce a single accepted
verbal formula, but any court would be free to restate the principle in
different words. It is the implication of the principle and not its specific
wording that the courts claim is constitutionally binding.
Teachers can point to the First Amendment more easily than explaining Australian Capital Television Pty Limited v The Commonwealth' to their
students. Students can readily memorise the Amendment's text and grasp
the idea that constitutional text is fundamental. Teachers are therefore
likely to discuss the express guarantee at an earlier point than the more
complex phenomenon of an implied freedom. Any society, whether its
constitutional guarantee is express, implied or nonexistent, can inculcate
an understanding of the principles of freedom of speech, but it is easier to
persuade children that the freedom is fundamental when it is stated expressly. English school children may be exposed to Milton 9 and MilP 0 and
to the importance of free speech as declaimed in Hyde Park, and some
Americans remain blissfully unaware of their constitutional rights
(except a:? distorted on television). English Jchool children learn that freedom of speech does not limit parliamentary power in their system of government. Where the principle of freedom of speech limits the legislature,
students will be taught the reasons for the limitation, but disagreement
with those reasons has different consequences when the principle is implied rather than express. If a student thinks the reasons for implying a
freedom are weak, he or she is challenging whether the principle is fundamental. Disagreement with the rationale for an express freedom, however, does not threaten the perception that the principle is fundamental
in this society. The embodiment of a principle in an -express provision

7

Theophanous v Herald & Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 124 ALR 1, 11 (footnote citations omit-

R

(1992) 177 CLR 106.

ted).
9

10

John Milton, Areopagitica: A Speech for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing, To the Parliament
of England 1644 (London: N. Douglas, 1927).
.
John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (London: 1859; reprinted Harmondsworth, Baltimore: Penguin, 1974).
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therefore gives it a momentum for acceptance by citizens that the judicial
pronouncement of an implied freedom lacks.

Support for the Judicial Role
Disagreement with judicial interpretation of an express provision is not a
challenge to the existence of the provision, and it rarely attacks the role of
the court as interpreter. The principle was adopted by the people, and the
issue is whether the court's particular application is correct. The court
may be wrong, but it is the appropriate body to interpret express language in the Constitution.
The authority of the judiciary to imply a constitutional limit is itself
implied from the Constitution. Where an implied freedom is in question,
the challenge to the implication is closer to a crihcism of the court's role
- namely, the court is wrong because its appropriate role is limited to
the interpretation of express language. The principle appears to have been
judicially created, and the challenge is to its very existence.
It is easy to exaggerate the difference. Even judges who disagree with
the implied right of political discussion agree that the Constitution gives
rise to implications that limit government power.U The argument that it
is improper for a judg~ to imply rights is a weak one. The stronger argument is that the particuiar right is not properly implied rather than a challenge to the court's role. Nevertheless, the implication of a constitutional
freedom highlights the creative function of the court.

Difficulty of Termination
Only a constitutional amendment can abolish the First Amendment. Although there have been proposals to change the Constitution to overturn
Supreme Court free speech decisions, most recently in response to the
invalidation of a federal law against burning the flag, 12 none have yet
passed the first step of securing Congressional approval.
The Australian High Court can overturn its decisions on freedom of
political discussion. The court has changed its view on constitutional
implications in. the past. In the Engineers case, 13 for example, the High Court
of Australia reconsidered whether the existence of State powers gave rise
to an implied limit on national powers. The power to terminate an im-

11

12

13

For example, 'an election in which the electors are denied access 'o the information necessary for the exercise of a true choice is not the kind of election envisaged by the Constitution': Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106,187, per
DaM;onJ.
Texas v Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co. Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 129.
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plied freedom by interpretation distinguishes it from the express clause
at the level of the formal existence of a constitutional principle.
Whether an implied freedom is less protective than an express one
depends primarily on factors external to the distinction between implied
and express. During its first 130 years, the First Amendment to the United
States' Constitution had no bite. At first, the Supreme Court interpreted
freedom of speech to proscribe previous restraints on speech but not to
prevent subsequent punishment 'of such as may be deemed contrary to
the public welfare'. 14 Later it said the Amendment permits punishment
of those who abuse freedom by utterances 'inimical to the public welfare,
tending to corrupt morals, incite to crime, or disturb the public peace'. 15
Coupled with a deferential presumption in favour of the validity of legislation, this 'bad tendency' test invalidated no laws. After all, unless the
government perceives a danger from speech, it has no reason to act.
Holmes J changed his views on the First Amendment and began writing
dissents in 1919 that urged more protection for speech. 16 Holmes and
Brandeis JJ dissented in free_ speech cases for more than a decade before
their views gained majority support. 17 The United States' Supreme Court,
in 1954, upheld the imprisonment of a number of leading American communists despite free speech arguments. 18 In contrast, the Australian High
Court was able to protect the existence of the Communist Party with no
reference to any constitutional guarantee of free speech. 19
Since judicial interpretation can render both express and implied
freedoms ineffective, the insulation of an express provision from a formal
repeal by the court is significant only to the extent that its formal existence is significant.
It is as unlikely that the High Court of Australia will reverse its decision on the implied freedom of political discussion as it is that the Supreme Court will revert to the hollow reading of the First Amendment.
Precedent and the current domestic and international context of concern
for human rights support a meaningful restriction on government power
to interfere with political discussion. Nevertheless, the express provision
supports judicial confidence in the appropriateness of the court's role to
enforce the principle against other institutions of government. The lack
of such demonstrated support may make courts more cautious in limiting government. Thus they may imply a freedom within a more limited

14

15

16
17

1
'
19

Patterson v Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907).
Gitlow v New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (emphasis supplied).
See Abrams v United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
Git/ow v People of New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (Holmes and Brandeis JJ dissenting);
Whitney v California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (Brandeis and Holmes JJ concurring).' Although
no case subsequent to Whitney and Gitlow has expressly overruled the majority opinions
in those cases, there is little doubt that subsequent opinions have inclined toward the
Holmes-Brandeis rationale': United States v Dennis, 341 US. 494 (1954).
US v Dennis, 341 U.S. 494 (1954).

The Amalgamated Engineering Union Australia Section and Rowe v The Commonwealth (Communist Party Dissolution case) (1951) 83 CLR 1.
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range than would be found for a provision that expressly articulated
the principle.

The Consequences of Entrenchment
The vulnerability of an implied freedom to reversal or at least restricted
application is arguably an advantage. Any constitutional provision may
be unwise, because it enables the judiciary to overturn laws that the majority of the nation believE's to be both desirable and consistent with freedom of speech. Defamn.tion, 20 campaign spending reform/ 1 and hate
speech laws 22 are all exr.mples of legislation that a majority may find appropriate, although a court may impose sharp limits on them. Although
processes of government preclude any easy identification of Parliament
with the will of the majority, the legislature is still a better reflection of
popular will than the court. 23 Thus the more limited the judicial protection of a constitutional right, the more responsive the principle will be to
the people.
A further 1rgument against constitutionalising rights is that it may
encourage p'.c!ople to rely on the court at the expense of the political process. This can lead to the loss of the principle's vitality in society as a whole
because i 1: is not debated in the political forum. 24 Even advocates of judicial activism in the United States are now urging greater focus on the
political process. 25 This argument is very contextual, for there may be no
discu :>sion and no protection of any sort in the absence of an express provisirJn. In a modified form, however, it has been a popular argument in
Australia. Where there is a tradition of freedom of speech, the people
may be trusted to care for it. 26
The United States has been less trusting of the people. The purpose of
an individual rights guarantee, such as freedom of speech, is to limit the
power of government over the individual. Proponents of such guaran20

21

22
23

24
25

See New York Times v Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) [U.S.]; Theopl~anous v Herald & Weekly
Times Ltd (1994) 124 ALR 1 [Australia].
See Buckley v Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) [U.S.]; Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106 [Australia].
R.A. V. v City of St. Paul112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992); see David Bogen, 'A United States Perspective on the Racial Hatred Bill1994' [unpublished manuscript on file with the Review].
See Gabriel A. Moens, 'The Wrongs of a Constitutionally Entrenched Bill of Rights', in
M.A. Stephenson and Clive Turner (eds), Australia: Republic or Monarchy (Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 1994); Jeremy Waldron, Liberal Rights: Collected Papers 198191 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
See Paul Brest, 'Constitutional Citizenship' (1986) 34 Cleveland Stale Law Review 1.
Robin West, 'Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism' (1990) 88 Michigan Law

Review 641.
26

See R.C.L. Moffatt, 'Philosophical Foundations of the Australian Constitutional Tradition' (1965) 5 Sydney Law Review 85, 86; Owen Dixon, 'Two Constitutions Compared', in
Hon. J. Woinarski (ed.), Jesting Pilate and other Papers and Addresses (Sydney: Law Book
Co., 1965), 100; Robert Menzies, Central Power in the Australian Commonwealth (London:
Cassell, 1967), 54.
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tees are not dismayed by popular disagreement with particular decisions
that restrict government. Conflict over the application of principles is inevitable, and a check outside the legislature helps to assure that the resolution does not always favour government.

THE DERIVATION OF AN IMPLIED FREEDOM
An implication is a product of a chain of reasoning and the court is likely
to articulate its basis. The Australian guarantee of freedom of political
discussion is inferred from the principle of representative democracy. 27
The rationale for an express freedom may be less clear. The First Amendment does not state its rationale, and multiple justifications have been
urged, with sometimes inconsistent effects on the scope of the provision
and the standards under it. Changing an implied freedom into an
express one may increase judicial discretion by expanding the possible
supporting rationales and encouraging courts to be less deferential to
govemrnent.

The Articulation of Rationale
A court construing an express provision can discuss and explore thoroughly its rationale, while one that has an implied freedom may rely on
precedent rather than discussion in future decisions. The tendency, however, is likely to be to the contrary. Where a principle is expressly stated in
the Constitution, the particular rationale may not be critical to its application and a court need not be concerned with persuading the public that
it is ,acting appropriately in enforcing the principle. On the other hand,
the legitimacy of the court's action in applying an implied principle depends upon the rationale, so the court is more likely to refer to it. The
need to recur to the rationale for the implied freedom keeps the rationale
vital in a way related to the vitality produced by forcing the principle to
be the subject of political debate. The principle may be better understood
because it is not just the principle, but its rationale as well that must be
discussed.
This does not mean there is only one possible rationale for implying a
freedom. The opinions found in recent decisions of· the High Court of
Australia vary. McHugh f 8 implied from the express provisions on election that candidates must be able to present their views to the electorate

27
2
'

Theophanous v Herald & Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 124 ALR 1, 11.
Id. 71-77, per McHugh J dissenting.

198

DAVIDs. BOGEN

(1995)

after the election is called. Mason CJ/9 Gaudron 30 and Brennan JV' inter
alia,3 2 found in provisions on constitutional amendment as well as those
on elections an implication of representative democracy that extends to
discussion among individuals of any political issue. Toohey and Deane
JP3 have even suggested there are fundamental rights implied in the very
formation of the Constitution. 34 The point is not that there can be only
one basis to imply freedom of speech, but that the absence of an express
provision requires the court to articulate the basis for its decision in terms
of an underlying rationale.

The Possibility of Multiple Rationales
The First Amendment lacks the single coherent rationale. It reflected widespread fear that the national government would seize power and engage
in legislation restricting speech - if restrictions were warranted, it was
thought to be a matter for state law. At this general level, few people had
and few needed any specific definition for the concept.35 Most of the philosophical justifications for the provision have been articulated after the
clause itself was adopted.
In the 19th century, Mill36 argued for freedom of speech as the best
mechanism for attaining truth. This theory was seized upon by Holmes J
in Abrams v U.S. 37 when he diss~nted, stating, 'The best test of truth is
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of
the market.'
In the 20th century, Alexander Meiklejohn contended that freedom of
speech was a necessary precondition for self-govemment. 38 His views on
the scope of protection broadened dramatically in response to Professor
Zechariah Chafee's critique. 39 The theory of democratic self-government
underlies the Australian High Court's decisions, and it is evident in numerous American cases including New York Times v Sullivan. 40

29

Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Tire Cornmonwealtlr (1992) 177 CLR 106, 139.

30

ld. 221.

Nationwide News Pty Limited v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1, 48.
32 Id. 72-75, per Deane and Toohey JJ; Leighton McDonald, 'The Denizens of Democracy:
The High Court and the "Free Speech" Cases' (1994) 5 Public Law Review 160.
33
Leeth v The Commonwealth (1992) 174 CLR 445, 485-7; L. Zines, 'A Judicially Created Bill
of Rights' (1994} 16 Sydney Law Review 166, 180-4.
"' See Leeth v The Commonwealth (1992} 174 CLR 455, 485-7, per Deane and Toohey JJ dis31

senting.
See David Bogen, Bulwark of Liberty (New York: Associated Faculties Press, 1984).
,. Mill, supra n. 10.
37 250 u.s. 616 (1919).
30
Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speeclr and its Relation to Self-Government (New York: Harper,
1948}.
39 Rodney Smolla, Free Speech in an Open Society (New York: Knopf, 1992), 15-16 .
.. 376 u.s. 254 (1964).
35

~
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Self-government and the search for truth are instrumental justifications for freedom of speech- that is, the court protects free speech in
order to attain a higher end. There are a number of other justifications of
this nature that receive less attention in the literature. Brandeis J once
wrote, 'Sunlight is said to be the best disinfectant.' 41 It is better to permit
people with despicable views to air them than to forbid their utterance
because (1) it gives them a release, like the steam valve, to prevent their
grievance from festering and forcing them to violent reaction; (2) it opens
their views to rebuttal that may change their opinions; and (3) it enables
society to know where the dangers may come from. Another argument
for freedom of speech put forward by Lee Bollinger is that 1t benefits the
character of society to be tolerantY
A very different philosophical base for freedom of speech focuses on
the speaker rather than the society's interest in allowing speech. Brandeis
J argued that 'free speech is valuable both as an end and as a means'.
Concurring in Whitney v California, 43 he said, '[T]hose who won our independence believed that the final end of the state was to make men free to
develop their faculties.'
The various strands of justification often unite when the court discusses the principle of free speech. Kennedy J stated, 'At the heart of
the First Amendment lies the principle that each person should decide
for him or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration and adherence. Our political system and cultural life rest upon
this ideal. ' 44
The multiplicity of rationales means the principle may extend farther
than any single rationale would justify. The search for truth or concerns
for self-government may underlie the protection of the distribution of
mechanically reproduced speech while concern for self-realisation supports the Amendment's application to nude dancing.
The multiple rationales may also complicate the standards used and
add to the uncertainty of results reached. Where multiple rationales are
available, emphasis on one rationale over another can be used to contract
the scope of the guarantee or to weaken the standard used to judge constitutionality. Commercial speech 45 and appeals to sexuality, 46 for example, are sometimes discussed as lesser forms of protected speech which
receive a lower standard of protection.

"
42
43
44
45

4•

Louis D. Brandeis, Ot/1er People's Money and How tl1e Bankers Use It (New York: Stokes,
1914).
Lee Bollinger, The Tolerant Society: Freedom of Speech and Extremist Speech in America (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1986).
274 U.S. 357 (1927).
Thrner Broadcasting System v Federal Communications Commission 114S. Ct. 2445,2458 (1994).
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v Public Service Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
'Society's interest in protecting this type of expression is of a wholly different, and lesser.
magnitude than the interest in untrammelled political debate': Young v Amencan M1m
Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (Stevens J).
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Insistence on a single rationale for the protection of freedom of speech
has the weakness that repudiation of that rationale eliminates the principle. Where multiple rationales support a principle, the elimination of
one may not prove fatal. In core areas, the principle is supported by all
its rationales.

CONSTRAINING THE EXPRESS PROVISION
The express provision for freedom of speech in the United States offers
great discretion to the courts because choice can be made from a variety
of rationales. It is not unreasonable for a society to believe that some of
these rationales do not justify invalidating laws made by majoritarian
institutions while others do, and to consider appropriate methods of limiting the scope of the provision. A common form in some of the original
declarations of rights in the states was to include a preamble that
discussed reasons for the commands that followed. A statement of
the principle in terms of its rationale or with a preamble that pointed
to the rationale could serve equally well to confine the principle to the
specific rationale. 47
Opponents of the implication of rights might be tempted to support
an express guarantee as a means of restraining the court on the theory
that it would not go beyond the limits justified by the language of the
express guarantee. The express nature of the provision has not been a
significant limitation on the court's interpretive discretion in the United
States. The words 'freedom of speech and of the press' are capable of
application to all forms of speech and publication whether public or private, commercial or altruistic, gossip or philosophy, sex or science. The
words do not preclude the court from extending their express scope by
implication. The Supreme Court has reasoned that freedom of speech
implies freedom of association. The communication of ideas requires
an audience. 48 Speech, in the sense of language, is only one medium for
communicating ideas. Recognising that sign language is a form of speech
is only a small step from finding that any means of communicating ideas
is within the scope of freedom of speech and press. Scalia J, of the
Supreme Court, has insisted that conduct is not protected by the First
Amendment unless the rationale for its regulation is the suppression of
its communicative aspects. 49 The remaining members of the court, however, have swept nude dancing and flag burning into the protected area
of the First Amendment.

" Such a constraint is only relative. The words themselves would not be determinative.
See Anthony D'Amato, 'Can Legislatures Restrain Judicial Interpretation of Statutes?'
(1989} 75 Virginia Law Review 561.
'" NAACP v Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
•• Barnes v Glen Tlreater, 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
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CONCLUSION
If the Australian people decide to adopt an express guarantee of freedom

of speech by amendment to their constitution, it is likely to encourage the
High Court to take an expansive view of that protection. The scope of the
freedom may be described with greater precision and the rationale made
express as ways to confine the court to the policy of protecting self-government. Nevertheless, the announcement of that principle by express
constitutional proclamation would reaffirm the correctness of the court's
perception that it is a basic principle of Australian society and would be
likely to encourage the justices to act more boldly in giving it content.

